One can not defend a dominion with a rosary in hand

Sergei Blagov

The Caodaists desperately sought to ensure the survival of their movement versus French reprisals and achieve independence for Vietnam. In November 1942 Tran Quang Vinh - who was fired by the French earlier that year after two decades of service - contacted the Japanese in Saigon.  Vinh signed the program of cooperation with the Japanese, who promised protection for Caodaists, while Vinh agreed to assist the Japanese army by calling on the Caodaists to enlist as volunteers. More that 10,000 young Caodaists worked for the Japanese installations, notably Nitinan shipyard. After the work, they were given military and intelligence training. Vinh also organized 3,000-strong paramilitary corps.  Caodaist forces were formed under the Japanese aegis and reportedly on the instruction of Prince Cuong De - the Volunteers of the Interior, and the Body Guard with a total of 3,240 men between 18 and 40 years of age.  The Caodaists became involved in the Japanese coup of 9 March 1945 - the Cao Dai men, dressed in white uniforms and berets, and armed with sharp bamboo sticks, arrested many Frenchmen and were placed as guards in front of some buildings in Saigon.

On March 18, 1945 Tran Quang Vinh organized 50,000-strong meeting in Saigon and announced that the Caodaists - with a background  of their earlier secret cooperation with the Japanese - had to help the Japanese army to overthrow the French. Caodaist military leader Nguyen Van Thanh argued that Prince Cuong De had ordered the creation of the Cao Dai paramilitary units. Nguyen Van Thanh described the French as “number one” enemy of the Caodaist forces, “allies of the Great Japan.” Then the news of Japanese surrender shook the Caodaists.

Nonetheless, the second Viet Minh government, formed September 10, actively sought representatives  from the Cao Dai, and the movement affiliated.  On the morning of 23 September, with the knowledge of the British Commander in Saigon, French forces overthrew the local DRV government, and declared French authority restored in Cochinchina. Guerrilla war began around Saigon.

On October 15-16 1945 the French troops ransacked the main Caodaist temple and stripped it bare, five dignitaries were murdered. On 9 October 1945, Tran Quang Vinh  was arrested by the Viet Minh, but he managed to escape on January 20, 1946. On 17 February 1946, Vinh arrived in Saigon, and he had to hide in Cho Lon. But on 8 May he was arrested by the French. Facing the imminent annihilation of the movement by both the French and the Viet Minh, Vinh had to accept conditions of Bazin, the chief of 2eme Bureau.

On 9 June 1946 the agreement on Franco-Caodaist alliance was signed. The French were to allow Pham Cong Tac and other exiled dignitaries to return to Vietnam; to guarantee the freedom of cult to Caodaists, to permit the reopening of the Holy See, and all the temples in Vietnam and Cambodia; to recognize officially Caodaist religion; to halt persecution of the Caodaist dignitaries and adepts.

In response Tran Quang Vinh had to order all Caodaist armed groups to halt attacks against the French troops. The Caodaist forces, organized as self-defense troops, were to be turned into Forces Suppletifs of the French Army, with an independent command. All the related expenses were to be covered by the Expeditionary Corps. In the eyes of radical nationalists the Franco-Caodaist agreement was a betrayal, and Viet Minh’s retaliation ensued. According to Caodaist historians, after 1946 thousands of Caodaists were killed by the Viet Minh, some of them buried alive and the whole villages wiped out - more than 40,000 Caodaist dignitaries and adepts were massacred in Southern and Central Vietnam during 1945-1954. Communist sources conceded that “during 1946-1947 some provinces carried out erroneous policy towards Caodaism.”

In 1947 Pham Cong Tac announced that Caodaism faced an enemy trying to exterminate the faithful, the Communists. He argued that Caodaists opposed Viet Minh  because “Communism was too violent”. To face the enemy, the military build-up in Tay Ninh ensued. On  February 7, 1947 Caodaist army was officially inaugurated at  the Holy See as “Great Community for Guarding Righteousness and Humanity”. The armed adepts were declared to be “Soldiers of the Heavenly Path”, and the army itself  was believed to be the instrument of “The Peace for the World”. Though Pham Cong Tac never quoted Macchiavelli, but the leader of Tay Ninh church probably believed that one cannot defend a dominion with rosary in hand.  The leadership of Caodaist army included: Tran Quang Vinh - commander-in-chief; General Nguyen Van Thanh - deputy  commander-in-chief; Colonel Nguyen Vo Ba - Chief of staff; Colonel Nguyen Thanh Phuong - Commander; Colonel Trinh Minh The - commander for the Western provinces.

But despite high military ranks, given by the French, many of the Caodaist military leaders represented marginal strata of the post-colonial society - Nguyen Van Thanh, used to be a carpenter, and Nguyen Thanh Phuong was a former sergeant of the colonial infantry.  Apart from the field troops, there was a Holy Guard, a battalion of Honor, and shock troops to protect the Holy See. They ran an officers’ school, and the Army had its own workshops for manufacturing pistols and rifles.

Although the French authorized below 2,000 men under arms, according to the terms of military convention, the Caodaist army soon expanded to over 10,000 by 1948. At the height of its power, the Cao  Dai had military chaplains. By 1953, most of the 215 French posts in Tay Ninh province were manned by Cao Dai troops. According to the agreement of 1947, Caodaists got control over large parts of Tay Ninh and My Tho: taxes were paid to Caodaist administration.

In January 27, 1947 the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao concluded a formal alliance. But despite their shared fear of Viet-Minh attacks, the alliance proved to be volatile. Putting it in words of British novelist Graham Greene, by early 1950s Caodaists were usually at war with the Hoa Hao, and the flags often changed on the watchtowers.  In joining with the French, all the rural sects were to demonstrate that autonomy for their territorial organization was more fundamental to them, than independence for the whole country. But sometimes nationalist feelings prevailed. Thus despite their cooperation with the  French, Cao Dai representatives, meeting in Hue in January 1948, firmly opposed the French maneuver to separate Cochinchina from the rest of Vietnam, demanded political independence, control of foreign relations, all internal economic matters and a national army.

Trinh Minh The and Lien Minh: The Third Force in the making.

Trinh Minh The, called “l’enfant terrible” by the French, looked like a kid, “youth of high school age, no more than five feet tall and may be weighing ninety pounds.” But he represented a homegrown politico-religious movement. He was born in Tay Ninh province in 1922. His father, Trinh Thanh Quoi, was a Cao Dai follower. Trinh Minh The and Viet Minh leader in the South Nguyen Binh were said to be the classmates at the Japanese guerrilla warfare school. By 1945 he was an officer in the secret Caodaist military unit formed at the Nichinan shipyard in Saigon and participated in Japanese coup in March. To many Vietnamese Trinh Minh The was a Robin Hood. Due to his initial affiliation with Kempeitai, he was described as a pro-Japanese diehard.

Trinh Minh The found excellent military career opportunities in the Caodaist armed forces - between 1946 and 1948 he advanced from head of operational department up to Ben Cau area commander and then Eastern region commander.

Trinh Minh The was understood to have little interest in the religion and he denied that there was any supernatural involvement in establishing Caodaism.

On June 6, 1951 the Officers club of Caodaist army in Tay Ninh was venue for a reception - the Caodaists military and their French allies marked the appointment of 29-year-old colonel Trinh Minh The as Cao Dai Army chief of staff. On June 6, 1951 he defected and formed his own army, vowing to fight both the French and the Communists from Bu Lu military zone. Many Caodaists joined him including his father, who was a lieutenant in his son’s forces, and four brothers: father and brothers later were killed in combat with Communists.

The’s defection was designed to widen security zone around the Holy See, and mutual anathematizing was just camouflage for cooperation between Tac and The. The general repeatedly paid night-time visits to Tac. Before departing, The had hidden some weapons - covered with grease - on the bottom of Vam-Co river. Practicing what Lansdale jocularly referred to as the “unorthodox doctrine of zapping a commander”, Trinh Minh The had murdered French General Chanson in 1951 and blew up a car in front of the Opera House in Saigon in 1952.

In 1952 Trinh Minh The moved all his Lien Minh forces to the mountain of Nui Ba Den, fulfilling the widely believed prophecy of local soothsayers that “the Genius General of God” would one day come and live on the mountain.

Estimates of his guerilla forces ranged from 500 to 10,000: the precise number was around 2,500. Trinh Minh The instigated terrorist outrages in Saigon, using an explosive based on legally imported synthetic rubber for making “bicycle bombs”  - clockwork plastic charges in vehicles, bicycle frames with charges.Then Trinh Minh The kidnapped Tran Quang Vinh, probably because Vinh’s opposition to Caodaist general Nguyen Thanh Phuong. Vinh stayed in captivity at The’s base on Ba Den mountain for about six months.

On January 20, 1955 the French agreed to turn over the  full control of the Vietnamese armed  forces to Vietnamese government within five months. The sect armies - about 40,000, and 9,000 Binh Xuyen in Saigon and immediate suburbs plus a small band of Catholic militia under colonel Leroy who allied with Bay Vien - had had their regular military pay as suppletifs stopped by French in January.

But the sect armies took a share of the Southern rice harvest in January through March and normally were affluent until June, when a lack of regular pay would pose a real  problem. This is why only 6,000 of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen  troops had been integrated by January 1955.

Diem was furnishing the religious groups several million piasters per month, though the exact amount was unknown even to US special envoy Lawton Collins who doubted wisdom of permitting use of American aid for sect subsidy except for legitimate pay of sect forces integrated into National Army.

About 3,000 Cao Dai and similar number Hoa Hao troops now thus integrated, out of total of 15,000 to 20,000 for each group in private armies.

With permission from the embassy, the SMM then began secretly paying funds to The, who offered his services to Diem. After the US Embassy provided secret funding, later estimated at US$2 million, colonel Edward Lansdale convinced Trinh Minh The to join the government.  On January 30, Diem accompanied by Defense Minister Minh, flew by helicopter to the Tay Ninh area for a secret meeting with Trinh Minh The.

At that meeting Trinh Minh The agreed to rally his forces to the National government. The’s terms: The would become a general in the National Army, 2,500 of his troops to be integrated, the remaining 1,500 to be employed as unarmed Social Action cadres.

Lansdale and Diem allegedly spent over $12 million to pay back salaries and “bonuses” to those who cooperated in “integrating” into the ARVN.

On February 13, 1955 arrangements finally were completed for the integration of The’s 2,500 men into the national army. They marched along Boulevard Norodom, down rue Catinat. Many of them were barefoot, although those who owned rubber basketball or tennis shoes wore them and marched in the outside ranks nearest to the spectators to help hide the bare feet of their comrades.

When later suspicions arose that Lansdale had bribed sect leaders he inevitably reacted angrily. In his autobiography he complained about French “soreheads,” who circulated “convoluted fictions about my bribing Vietnamese with huge sums of money.” He asserted that the most had ever given The was “a cup of coffee or a meal when he visited with me.” When pressed, he did admit that he provided The with “a month’s pay” for his troops when The integrated them into the Vietnamese army.  Yet payments he did make, not only to The but to others as well. Nguyen Thanh Phuong, a Cao Dai general, demanded and received $3 million for his loyalty in addition to monthly payments for his troops. Asked again many years later about his payoff to The, Lansdale remained characteristically close-mouthed, falling back for explanation on a faulty memory.  Diem government continued the pay the sect forces’ stipends until the Front was formed. On March 5, 1955 Bay Vien called a meeting of the leaders of the sects in Cho Lon. Bay Vien told that the people of South Vietnam needed a better government, than “that fool” Diem was providing. A formal United National Front was agreed upon: Pham Cong Tac was to be a supreme chief and Ba Cut was named a field commander in case of need, although the various sect armies were to remain  independent.  Lansdale was working feverishly to break the United Front.

On March 8, Trinh Minh The declared that he was cooperating with Diem and could not adhere with the organization which which had not support of its government. The, whose decision to join the Front caused a sensation, changed his mind and announced that he would continue to “cooperate” with Diem. Hoa Hao’s Ba Cut claimed that The’s decision had been clinched by a yet another cash payment alleged to amount to 20 million piasters. When The left the Front, he did not bother to inform his allies, who learned the news of defection from the radio broadcast.

Those remaining in the Front went ahead with their plans.  Probably alarmed at the prospect of mass desertions of their unpaid troops, the Front sent the ultimatum to Diem on March 22, telling him  that he had until March 27 to agree to it, “or else”. The Front demanded to form a government of larger national union and to replace the present government within 5 days.

The demand seemingly lacked substance - in September, 1954 Diem appointed 8 members of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao to cabinet positions - out of 14. The Premier offered to negotiate, but the Front members refused. As the days passed, soldiers of the Binh Xuyen openly positioned mortars so they could bombard the palace if Diem allowed the deadline to pass. Lansdale argued that by use of force, the vice overlord Bay Vien was  going to attempt to seize the reins of government. It was evident that Bao Dai was encouraging Bay Vien to act.

On March 28, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao ministers resigned.  General Ely later claimed that it was difficult to determine the responsibility for the initial incident in Saigon, 6 deaths which occurred on March 27.  But Nhu later admitted that the government deliberately pushed the United Front into armed combat on 29-30 March 1955. 6 were killed and 34 wounded in the National army, 10 killed and 34 wounded for the Binh Xuyen, 10 killed and 58 wounded civilians. On March 31, the hostilities stopped on the streets of Saigon. On March 31, Nguyen Thanh Phuong rallied to Diem with 8,000 troops. Phuong neglected to inform Tac, who caused some confusion next day denying that Caodaist forces had been transferred to the government.  Phuong argued that he joined the government because his 15,000-strong troops had not been paid for several months. By joining Diem he found somebody to pay his men, but this in no way meant that he supported Diem’s policy and he vowed to continue opposing Diem by other means.  Ely showed Collins highly confidential memo of conversation between General Gambiez and Cao Dai General Phuong ... Phuong had said Cao Dai troop integration was meaningless, that both he and Trinh Minh The remained unalterably opposed to Diem, and has asked French for arms with which forcibly overthrow the government.   A candidate proposed to supplant Diem was Tran Van Huu. Collins commented to Ely that Phuong would undoubtedly say anything to anyone for personal gain.

The simple blocus of 3 days was enough to double food prices in Saigon. During April the population of  Saigon-Cholon area accustomed to the presence of hostile forces in their midst. The next two weeks were filled with the  unease of the  truce. Army and Binh Xuyen positions were strengthened with sandbags, so did the French. Lt-Col Duong Van Minh commanded army forces in Saigon-Cholon area.  In the meantime Trinh Minh The went to Indonesia as an official Vietnamese delegate to the 29 nations Conference in Bandung in April 18-23: he was said to represent the “Worker Syndicates”. On April 22, Nguyen Van Thoai, the minister for planning and reconstruction, the head of Southern delegation to Bandung, became the 13^th minister to retire since the beginning of the crisis. It left Trinh Minh The de facto head of the delegation.

Determined to get rid of Diem, General Collins flew back to Washington to press his case. Lansdale argued that if Diem left Vietnam, the police powers undoubtedly and wrongly would go back to the Binh Xuyen. In the eyes of the people, there would be no moral basis upon which the government could govern.

But the government believed the sects were unable to sustain resistance. On April 24 Diem dismissed Lai Van Sang, the Binh Xuyen police chief, and appointed colonel Nguyen Ngoc Le. The Unified Front claimed that Diem contacted Nguyen Van Soai, Lam Thanh Nguyen and Ba Cut and offered them 100 million piasters for rallying. On April 28, Bay Vien ordered to attack Diem. At 13.20, the Binh Xuyen’s  81 mm mortars shelled the palace.  The army counterattacked, seized Grand Monde.  Diem claimed that “peace was lost in Saigon only when Binh Xuyen fired mortar shells on the Government palace”. However, as it had happened in March, on 28 April fighting broke out in the boulevard Gallieni, provoked by the actions of paratroopers proceeding down the street in two trucks, who opened fire on a Binh Xuyen commando unit.  Le Van Vien, probably assuming that the French would stop the fighting, failed to  direct the resistance of his troops and refused to  commit his 4,000-strong reserves to the battle.

Between April 28 and May 3, 1955, when Binh Xuyen-ARVN house-to-house battle took place, more than a square mile of the center of Saigon had been burned out. The total of 500 soldiers and civilians were killed, 2,000 wounded, and 20,000 local people were left homeless.  When Collins arrived in Washington he quickly reported his views to President Eisenhower on 27 April. Eisenhower promised to support whatever Collins recommended. Collins told Dulles that Diem’s obstinacy was the reason for the violent confrontation in Saigon.  On what proved to be the crucial day, April 28, Diem summoned Lansdale and reported that Binh Xuyen units had begun firing on his troops and that the US appeared to be about to stop supporting him.  Lansdale reassured that “the US was still supporting him.” Diem ordered a counterattack against the Binh Xuyen, and within nine hours achieved a major victory.  Saigon was told to forget Dulles’s order to drop Diem and the embassy then burned the April 27 message.

Trinh Minh The stepped into the city with two of his Lien Minh battalions of 1,300 men. The afternoon of May 3, near Tan Thuan bridge Trinh Minh The had been struck behind the ear by a bullet. Lansdale claimed that from the angle at which he was hit, the rifleman had been behind and above him and there allegedly was a talk about French sniper of the nearly French defense position. The rebellious Caodaist general was buried on his beloved mountain Ba Den, alongside the men fallen with him at the bridge.

However, other sources said The was shot from behind, the wound was powder-blackened. The’s murderer identity and  motives remained a subject for  speculation - his terrorist methods made him many enemies. Some Caodaists argued however that Diem himself had ordered to kill Trinh Minh The. Later the base of The’s  lieutenants Ba Den mountain was destroyed by Diem’s army, they fled  to Cambodia.

The fighting in 1955 seemed to be a confrontation between semi-states, not between a dissident faction and a viable government. The religious movements were perceived as lacking of legitimacy in the eyes of the people abroad - thus causing support for Diem against the sects  by the rationale of “modernization”. From May 1955 on - in other words in the wake of The’s demise - final solution of so called “sect problem” was presumed to be reached and the U.S. commitment to Diem was complete. However, in the final analysis, the Lien Minh - as well as other paramilitary groups - were not integrated into South Vietnamese army. In the immediate aftermath of general The’s demise, Diem managed to crush all opposition, and took obstructive attitude toward national elections, which were never held.  It has been said that The, perceived as a truly independent nationalist, might provide Vietnam with better leadership than Diem, an installed “alternative” - speculations reminiscent of the claims that had President Kennedy lived, he would have pulled out of Vietnam. The question whether Trinh Minh The could solve an intractable problem of forestalling a total collapse in South Vietnam remains a subject for speculation. However, the demise of general The and his Lien Minh army, violent elimination of other movements, created a political vacuum in Southern Vietnam

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